Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility by Motolese, Maurizio (ORCID:0000-0002-3713-1640) & Kurz, Mordecai
 Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility
by
Mordecai Kurz and Maurizio Motolese
Stanford University and Catholic University of Milan
 January 22, 2000
For correspondence:
Mordecai Kurz, Joan Kenney Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Serra Street at Galvez
Stanford University
Stanford, CA. 94305-6072
mordecai@leland.stanford.edu
http://www.stanford.edu/~mordecai/
Summary. 
In this paper we advance the theory that the distribution of beliefs in the market is the most
important propagation mechanism of economic volatility.  Our model is based on the theory of
Rational Beliefs (RB) and Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) developed by Kurz [1994], [1997]. 
The paper argues that most of the observed volatility in financial markets is generated by the
beliefs of the agents and the diverse market puzzles which are examined in this paper, such as the
equity premium puzzle, are all driven by the structure of market expectations.  To make the case
in support of our view, we present a single RBE model with which we study a list of phenomena
that have been viewed as "anomalies" in financial markets. The model is able to predict the correct
order of magnitude of:  
(i)   the long term mean and standard deviation of the price\dividend ratio;
(ii)  the long term mean and standard deviation of the risky rate of return on equities;
(iii) the long term mean and standard deviation of the riskless rate;
(iv) the long term mean equity premium.
In addition, the model predicts 
(v) the GARCH property of risky asset returns;
(vi) the observed pattern of the predictability of long returns on assets;
(vii) the Forward Discount Bias in foreign exchange markets.
The common economic explanation for these phenomena is the existence of heterogenous
agents with diverse but correlated beliefs.  Given such diversity, some agents are optimistic and
some pessimistic about future capital gains.  We develop a simple model which allows agents to
be in these two states of belief but the identity of the optimists and the pessimists fluctuates over
time since any agent may be in these two states of belief at any date.  In this model there is a
unique parameterization under which the model makes all the above predictions simultaneously. 
Any parameter choice in this small neighborhood requires the optimists to be in the majority but
the rationality of belief conditions of the RBE require the pessimists to have a higher intensity
level.  This higher intensity  has a decisive effect on the market: it increases the demand for
riskless assets, decreases the equilibrium riskless rate and increases the equity premium.  In simple
terms, the large equity premium and the lower equilibrium riskless rate are the result of the fact
that at any moment of time there are agents who hold extreme pessimistic beliefs and they have a
relatively stronger impact on the market.  The relative impact of these two groups of agents who
are, at any date, in the two states of belief is a direct consequence of the rationality of belief
conditions and in that sense it is unique to an RBE.   The paper also studies the effect of
correlation of beliefs among investors.  It shows that the main effect of such correlation is on the
dynamic patterns of asset prices and returns and is hence important for studying such phenomena
as stochastic volatility.
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Other approaches to the equity premium puzzle were reported by Brennan and Xia [1998], Epstein2
and Zin [1990], Cecchetti, Lam and Mark [1990],[1993], Heaton and Lucas [1996], Mankiw [1986], Reitz
[1988], Weil [1989] and many others.  For more details see Kocherlakota
 [1996].
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The theory of Rational Belief Equilibrium (in short, RBE; see Kurz [1994], [1997]) was
developed with the view of studying the effects of the beliefs of economic agents on the volatility
of economic variables and on social risk.  Application of the theory to various markets were
reported by Kurz and Beltratti [1997], Kurz and Schneider [1996], Kurz [1997a], [1997b],
[1998], Nielsen [1997], and Wu and Guo [1998].  Some of these papers advanced the idea that
the "equity premium puzzle" due to Mehra and Prescott [1985] (in short, M&P [1985]), can be
resolved by the theory of Rational Beliefs (in short, RB).  This is in contrast with recent attempts
to resolve the equity premium puzzle by the use of a "habit forming" utility function (see Abel
[1999], Campbell and Cochrane [1999] and Constantinides [1990]) . 2
Most of the work on the equity premium concentrated on the analysis of the premium as
an isolated phenomenon and in this context researchers usually examine the riskless rate, the risky
rate and their second moments.  The fact is that there are other volatility phenomena which have
puzzled students of financial markets.  To our knowledge participants in the equity premium
2debate have not suggested that the question of excess stock price volatility raised by Shiller
[1981] is intimately related to the equity premium puzzle.  Indeed, the "calibration" literature has
mostly ignored the comparison between the model’s volatility of stock prices and the historical
record although such a comparison is one more test of the model’s ability to explain the data. 
Also, financial markets exhibit other dynamical patterns for which standard models have failed to
give a satisfactory explanation. Examples include stochastic volatility, the GARCH phenomenon
in asset returns, the "Forward Discount Bias" in foreign exchange markets and the various "smile
curves" in derivative asset pricing.  It is clear that the validity of any equilibrium theory should not
be judged by its ability to match any specific market statistic but rather by the range and depth of
market phenomena and "anomalies" that the theory is capable of explaining.
This paper is not another study of the equity premium.  In scope it is broader than
previous papers on RBE and it presents a unified framework for the study of market volatility.  It
argues that the distribution of beliefs is the central volatility propagation mechanism in the
market.  It thus claims that most volatility in financial markets is expectationally generated and
that many market "anomalies" such as the excess volatility of asset prices and foreign exchange
rates, the equity premium puzzle, the GARCH pattern of asset returns and the Forward Discount
Bias in foreign exchange markets are all driven by the structure of  heterogenous beliefs in the
market.  In support of this unified view of the volatility propagation mechanism we present a
single, relatively simple, market model and show by simulations that the RBE of the model is able
to explain a wide range of these phenomena.  First, it predicts the correct order of magnitude of
(i) the first and second moments of the price\dividend ratio, (ii) the first and second moments of
the risky return, (iii) the first and second moments of the riskless rate and hence of the equity
3premium.  Second, the time series of stock returns exhibit a GARCH phenomenon and are
consistent with the observed pattern of the predictability of long returns.  Third, an extension of
the model to a two countries model exhibits a high volatility of the foreign exchange rate and a
"forward discount bias" in its foreign exchange market. Technically speaking our model drastically
generalizes the approaches of Kurz and Beltratti [1997], Kurz and Schneider [1996] and Kurz
[1997b] with a simplified parameter space which satisfies anonymity in accord with Kurz [1998]. 
In addition, an important components of the paper are the integrated economic interpretations of
the results and the implied testable implications of the theory.  These are presented in Section 4.
Before turning to the description of our OLG model in Section 2, we discuss the merits of
the heterogenous belief paradigm and present a brief review of the RB theory.  Section 3 presents
the simulation results and Section 4 integrates our conclusions.
1.   A Paradigm of Heterogenous Beliefs
The theory of RBE is motivated by the observation that intelligent economic agents hold
diverse beliefs even when there is no difference in the information at their disposal.  Indeed, the
center of their disagreement is the diverse
 interpretations of this information.  By adopting axioms
which allow rational agents to hold diverse beliefs, our theory does not lead, in general, to a
Rational Expectations Equilibrium (in short, REE).  However, an REE is also an RBE since the
theory of RBE is an extension of the theory of REE.  
The search for an extension of the theory of REE is motivated by the widespread
dissatisfaction with the REE model (see Sargent [1993]).  This results from the fact that central
implications of the REE theory are contradicted by the empirical evidence in many areas of
4Economics and Finance.  One recent line of research has focused on alternative choice criteria
such as Robustness (see Anderson, Hansen and Sargent [1999] or Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini
[1999]) even if such criteria imply behavior that is viewed as irrational by the REE or the RBE
theories.  Instead of adopting such a “Bounded Rationality” approach, we follow Kurz [1974],
[1994], [1998], the papers included in Kurz [1997], Garmaise [1998], Motolese [1998], Nielsen
[1997] and Wu and Guo [1998] in studying the heterogeneity of beliefs as the key propagation
mechanism of market volatility.  We note the existence of ample empirical evidence to support the
view that equally informed agents interpret differently the same  information
 
(see Frankel and
Froot [1990], Frankel and Rose [1995], Kandel and Pearson [1995], Takagi [1991] and others). 
Moreover, the heterogeneity of beliefs persists regardless of the amount of past information
available implying that agents use different probability beliefs which they condition on the same
public information.  Before proceeding with our development we discuss the common REE view
which holds that the observed diversity of beliefs originates in the heterogeneity of information.
1a.   Diversity of Information or Diversity of Beliefs? 
Starting with financial markets, there is a significant REE based literature which holds that
the observed heterogeneity of beliefs does not arise from the heterogeneity of prior probabilities
but, rather, from the diversity of private information (see, for example, Kyle [1985], Wang [1993]
[1994] and references there).  This explanation is unsatisfactory from both theoretical as well as
empirical perspectives.  Theoretical considerations lead to the information revelation of REE (e.g.
Grossman [1981], Radner [1979]) which implies that prices make public all private information
and therefore the introduction of asymmetric information, by itself, is not sufficient.  It simply
5transforms the problem into other paradoxes.  These include the problem of explaining why under
REE agents trade at all (e.g. Milgrom and Stokey [1982]); why asset prices fluctuate more than
could be explained by "fundamentals" (e.g.  Shiller [1981]), indirectly generating an equity
premium puzzle (see M&P [1985]); and why any resources are ever used for the production of
information (see Grossman and Stiglitz [1980]). To explain the observed heterogeneity and avoid
such paradoxes researchers had, therefore, to introduce some additional assumptions of market
structure that would remove the information revelation property of REE.  Consider the explicit
introduction of uninformed noise traders or general "noise" which leads to a theory of "noisy
rational expectations equilibrium."  This is a negation of REE since  the assumption of noise in
prices explicitly introduces
 irrationality of uninformed traders into the theory.  This artificial
assumption of irrationality is then the one driving all the important conclusions.
Empirical considerations also suggest that the assumption of asymmetric information in
financial markets is unsatisfactory.  We have already noted the ample empirical evidence in
support of the opposite view that equally informed agents interpret differently the same 
information.  This leads to a simple question: is there any empirical evidence to support the
assumption of  widespread use of private information in financial markets?  We think that the
evidence is not there.  Observe first that since it is illegal to trade on inside private information,
are we to conclude that the high volatility of financial markets is a result of widespread and
persistent criminal behavior by traders?  The  majority of firms whose securities are traded on
public exchanges are monitored carefully by a professional community of regulators, brokers and
financial managers.  Hence there  is ample evidence that, on the whole, the majority of firms avoid
letting any market participant either obtain private information or trade on it if he has such
6information.  Furthermore, since modern financial markets are dominated by large institutions
with vast resources, elementary competitive behavior in the search for information should lead us
to conclude that all will possess essentially the same information. 
Turning to REE in macroeconomics, the critique of the Keynesian theory was associated
with the rejection of the wage and price rigidities implicit in the Keynesian system.  However,
under the classical assumptions of price and wage flexibility and market clearing in equilibrium, an
REE cannot explain the observed cyclical correlation among economic variables such as the
positive correlation between the price level and aggregate output (the "inflation - output
tradeoff").  In order to explain the data, the New Classical Theory introduced asymmetric
information which became the driving force of the theory.  More specifically, agents are assumed
to be
 unable to obtain information which is public in other parts of the economy.  This rigidity in
the transmission of public information leads to diverse models of  Phelpsian or Lucasian  "islands"
(see Phelps [1970] and Lucas [1973]).  The important Lucas supply curve (Lucas [1973]) is then
deduced from the artificial assumption that firms are not able to observe the aggregate price level
which is normally an observable variable.  Hence, the heterogeneity in the beliefs of agents is
caused by an artificial informational assumptions.  As proposed by Lucas [1982], the models are
"rigged" to generate the heterogeneity which induces the desired empirical implication.
The arguments presented here highlight the fact that the
 
implications of the common belief
assumption in an REE - by itself -  are counter factual.  The crucial empirical implications of these
models are generated
 
by an added set of assumptions.  These include asymmetry of information,
rigidity in the transmission of information and outright irrational behavior of some agents.  These
added assumptions introduce "stories" with questionable theoretical and empirical foundations but
7these questionable assumptions are the ones which drive the results!
The theory of RBE provides the foundation for the use of heterogenous beliefs as a
substitute for the "additional" artificial assumptions which drive most of the REE based models. 
The theory suggests that the paradigm of diverse beliefs is entirely plausible and generates a
powerful propagation mechanism of social risk and market fluctuations.  The paradigm is based
on the hypothesis that agents do not know the true structural relationships in the economy. 
Consequently, rational agents may have diverse beliefs about what they do not know.  The
empirical evidence for these two components of our approach is substantial and this alternative
paradigm offers
 
useful economic insights with which we can answer difficult economic questions.
1b.  Rational Beliefs
The central assumption of the RB theory (due to Kurz [1994]) is that economic agents do
not know the exact demand or supply functions, equilibrium maps or true probability laws induced
by an equilibrium.  In the terminology of Kurz [1994], agents do not possess "structural
knowledge" (as distinct from "empirical knowledge" or "information").  Lacking structural
knowledge, rational agents develop their own theories about the underlying structure and use the
available data to test the validity of such theories.
The second assumption which distinguishes the RB theory from the Bayesian perspective
is that at each date an economic agent has at his disposal a vast amount of data about the past
performance of the economy.  Hence, instead of accepting Savage’s [1954] axioms on preferences
which imply an arbitrary prior belief, the agent’s central point of reference is the empirical
distribution derived from the frequency at which events occurred in the past.  The availability of a
xt  X I Ü
N
x 
 (x0 , x1 , x2 , . . )
xt 
 ( xt , xt1 , xt2 ,. . . )
It 
 ( x0 , x1 , x2 ,. . ., xt )
(xt , xt1 , xt2 ,. . ., xtL )
8
large amount of past data may lead one to speculate that learning by the agents may cause
heterogeneity of beliefs to vanish.  Work along this line was inspired by martingale convergence
theorems and lead to a heated debate under the heading of "Bayes Consistency" (see Diaconis and
Freedman [1986]).  The conclusion of the debate is that the convergence of the posterior to the
true distribution is a rare occurrence.  In two influential papers, Freedman [1963], [1965] shows
that even when the statistician has a controlled experiment and the data is generated  i.i.d., the
convergence of the posterior is a rare event if the true distribution is complex.  The problem is
compounded in learning situations in markets where the data is generated by an unknown process
which may be non-stationary and the convergence of the posterior to the true probability is even a
less likely event (see Feldman [1991]).
The third component of the RB theory is the observation that the economic life of any
agent is short relative to the clock at which new data arrives.  Thus, let    be a vector
of the N observables in the economy and let   be the history of the observed
data from date  0  to infinity.   Define the history from date  t  on  by  and
hence  x  = x.  The history up to date
 
 t  is defined by  .   An agent forms a0
belief at  t  about the probability of events in the future.  The theory assumes that  t  is very large
so that an agent can construct the empirical distribution generated by the history.  The agent’s life
L  is the span of time in which he makes decisions and  L  is very short relative to  t.  By this we
mean that investors, fund managers, CEO of a corporations etc. make decisions over periods
ranging from 10 to 20 years which is very short relative to t.  An agent’s belief may be correct or
not but the little data - - generated by the economy during his own
economic life is much too small to provide a reliable test of his theory since most economic data
X  (X  )
X  (X  )
m
n
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flow at the very slow annual or quarterly rates.  This is particularly true if the agent believes that
the data is generated by a non-stationary process and he has little data on each regime which may
be in place during an interval of time.  One must then conclude that the rationality of a belief  Q 
cannot be judged by the usual Bayesian learning criterion which insists on the compatibility of  Q 
with the limit of the data
 in the future.  Instead, the RB theory defines the rationality of belief in
terms of its compatibility with the empirical distribution of past data.
To explain the rationality conditions of the RB theory we start with the definition of 
Statistical Stability.  Let be the space of infinite sequences x  and % be the Borel )-field
of  .  For each finite dimensional set (cylinder set)  B  % define the expression
where
Although the set  B  is finite, it can be a very complicated set.  For example
.
Definition 1:  (Property 1)  A stochastic process {x  , t = 0, 1, 2, ...} with true probability $  on t
( ,%( )) is said to be Statistically Stable  if for each finite dimensional set B  %
We assume that the data is generated by a stable process but to simplify the exposition, we
also assume that the process is Ergodic.  This carries the implication that  
m
% ( B)
m
% X  X 
X  B 
 B (0 )
B (k ) x | xk  B
X  X 
X 
lim
n
1
n
M
n	1
k 
 0
$( B(k ) ) 
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m
%$ ( B) m$ X  X 
The assumption that the limit in Definition 1 is known to the agents is made to avoid the complexity3
of an approximation theory.  Without this assumption the diversity of beliefs would be increased due to the
diverse opinions about the approximation.  The assumption of Ergodicity is also not needed and is not made
in Kurz [1994].
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Our agents do not know  $  and start by computing the empirical frequencies.  Although they
have only finite data, we assume that they actually know the limits   in Definition 1 for all
cylinders.  Again, this assumption is made for simplification .  Technical work implies that the3
agents deduce from the data   a full probability measure  m  on the space  ( ,%( )). 
Indeed, we know (see Kurz [1994]) that
(i)   m  is unique;    (ii)  m is stationary and hence is called "the stationary measure of  $."
Since  m  is obtained from the data, there is no disagreement among the agents about it.  The
probability  m  is their common empirical knowledge.
Our agents who do not know the true probability $ discover from the data the probability 
m  induced by the dynamics under  $.  If the economy is stationary then  m = $  but agents could
not know this fact.  What are then the restrictions which the knowledge of  m places on the beliefs
of rational agents?  To answer this question we introduce the concept of Weak Asymptotic Mean
Stationary (WAMS) Dynamical System.  For an event B%( ) let    and   
= the event  B  occurring k periods later  .
Definition 2:  (Property 2) A system  {x  , t = 1, 2, 3, ...} with probability $  on ( ,%( ))t
is said to be WAMS  if for each finite dimensional (cylinder) event  B%( )
    exists.
The collection of    induces a unique probability   on  ( ,%( )) which is
X  X 
m(A) 
 m$(A) X 
X  X 
mQ (A) 
 m( A) X 
mQ g m
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n
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stationary.  For any WAMS probability Q, we shall then use the notation  m   to denote theQ
probability on ( ,%( )) induced by Property 2 which Q must satisfy.  The central result of
the RB theory can now be stated.
Theorem 1:  Properties 1 and  2 are equivalent and   for all events A %( ).
Agents compute  m  from the data and Theorem 1 leads to a natural definition of what it means 
for a probability belief  Q  to be “compatible with the data”, which  m  represents:
Definition 3: A probability belief  Q is said to be compatible with the observed data  m  if
(i)   Q  is a WAMS probability on  ( ,%( )),
(ii)       for all events A %( ).
Equality (ii) is the key implication of Theorem 1.  Now consider a rational agent with a belief  Q.  
If   was satisfied, it would constitute a proof that Q is not the truth.  Indeed, it would 
prove that the belief  Q  is not compatible with the data  m. This leads to our final definition.
Definition 4: A probability belief  Q  is said to be
 a Rational Belief (RB) relative to  m  if  Q  is 
compatible with the known data  m  and satisfies the rationality conditions
(1)   for all cylinder sets B %( ).
The rationality conditions in (1) are the central restrictions of the RB theory.  To see an example
for these conditions, let  t  be the current period and consider the following random variables: 
= the annualized rate of return on the S&P500 stock index  k  periods after date  t.
Consider the expectation  .  The time average of   is approximately 8% and if
Z (tk) E
m
[Z (tk) | It ]
1
n
M
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 0
EQ [Z (tk) | It ] x 8%
Z t1
Z (tk)
m g $
pt 
 0( It , Q 1t , Q 2t , Q 3t ,. . . . , Q Ht )
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12
some agents adopt  m as their belief,  is essentially unpredictable and   = 8% 
for all k.  Under a rational belief  Q  such that Q g m, the rationality conditions require that
   for large n.
It is a fact that in any experiment in which agents are asked to predict   there is a wide
distribution of forecasts but the distribution of   narrows down as  k increases.
The immediate implication of (1) is that under RB agents may disagree about probabilities
of short term events but not about long term averages.  Observe that  (i)   $  is a Rational Belief
and hence REE is an RBE;  (ii)  m is an RB although it is possible that  ;  (iii) RB  Q  and
the true  $  may disagree on timing or sequencing;  (iv) RB  Q  and the true  $  may put different
probabilities on important rare events;  (v) RB  Q   allows optimism/pessimism relative to m.
Several Important Observations
(i) We have already noted that if the agents believed that the economy is a stationary dynamical
system they would all adopt the universal beliefs Q = m.  Hence, the crucial feature of an RBE is
that it is an equilibrium theory in which agents believe that the economy is a non-stationary
process and
 their main uncertainty is about the structure of the process.  Any disagreement at
date  t  revolves around unknown parameters, such as the mean value function, of the stochastic
process of prices and quantities which prevails in the economy at that time.
(ii) When agents disagree, the distribution of beliefs affects excess demands functions and hence in
an economy in which
 the beliefs of H agents matters the equilibrium map takes the general form 
where  are date t conditional probabilities of the H agents.  In such
Q kt
G kj
G kj g 

G kj
G k1 G
k
1
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equilibria the distribution of beliefs
 
is a propagation mechanism of price volatility.  On the more
fundamental level, the RBE theory rejects the formulation of uncertainty as being only an
exogenous phenomenon.  It insists that economic uncertainty and fluctuations have a large
endogenous component which is propagated within the economy rather than being caused by
exogenous shocks.  Following Kurz [1974] we call it Endogenous Uncertainty.  Our paper claims
that this uncertainty is the dominant form of uncertainty in our society.  Endogenous Uncertainty
is, indirectly, the uncertainty about the beliefs and actions of other agents.  Hence we define:
Definition 5:  Endogenous Uncertainty is that component of price volatility which is 
caused by the distribution of beliefs.
(iii) Our final observation is simple but important: disagreement among agents in an RBE imply
that their conditional probabilities must fluctuate over time.  To be specific, consider a finite
state Markov economy and suppose the conditional probabilities   of agent k are represented
by J possible Markov matrices for  j = 1, 2,...J and  m  is represented by a single Markov
matrix  
.  If agents disagree then their beliefs are not represented by  
 and hence  .  The
rationality conditions imply that the average forecast of  k, each of which is made by some , 
must be the same as the forecast made under  
.  It would be irrational for agent k to use only one
matrix, say  , since the mean forecast under  is not equal to the forecast under  
.  Hence
in a world with disagreement, rational agents must use varying matrices over time.
Any application of the RBE theory requires a simplification of the very general rationality
conditions in (1).  We address this issue in the context of the model developed later.
C 1kt
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2.  The RBE of an OLG Stock Market Economy
Our stock market economy is a relatively standard two-agent, OLG, economy with a
single, homogenous, consumption good.  Each agent lives two periods, the first when he is
"young" and the second when he is "old."  Each young agent is a replica of the old agent who
preceded him, where the term "replica" refers to utilities and beliefs, and hence this is a model of
two infinitely lived "dynasties" denoted by k = 1, 2.  One can think of  k  as the identity of the pair
of young and old agents of the dynasty at date t.  We often use the term "agent k" but the context
should make it clear whether the agent is the young or the old of dynasty k.   Only young agents
receive an endowment  6 ,  t = 1, 2, .... of the single consumption good.  We view  6   as thet          
 
      t
k          
 
      k
labor income of agent  k  at date  t  and the stochastic processes {6 , t = 1, 2, ...}  for  k = 1, 2 tk
will be specified below.  Additional net output is supplied by a firm which produces exogenously,
as in Lucas [1978], the strictly positive profit process {D  , t = 1, 2, ...} with no input.  These nett
outputs are paid out to the shareholders of the firm as dividends at the date at which the output is
produced. The ownership shares are traded on a stock market and their aggregate supply is  1. 
The economy has three markets: (i) a market for the consumption good with an aggregate
supply equaling the total endowment plus total dividends, (ii) a stock market with a total supply
of 1, and (iii) a market for a zero net supply, short term riskless debt instrument which we call a
"bill".   Since the stochastic growth rate of dividends is Markovian with two states, the economy
has a complete financial structure in the sense that the number of financial instruments equals the
number of exogenous states.  The financial sector is initiated at date 1  by distributing the unit
supply of shares among the old of that date.  Our notation is as follows:  for k = 1, 2
 - consumption of  k when young  at  t;  
C 2kt1
dt1 

Dt1
Dt
pt 
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- consumption of  k when old at t + 1 (implying that the agent was born at t);
 - the random growth rate of dividends;
   - amount of stock purchases by young agent  k  at  t;tk
B  - amount of one period bill purchased by young agent  k  at  t;tk
6  - endowment of  young agent  k  at  t;tk
P  -  the price of the common stock at t and  - the price/dividend ratio at  t;t
- the price of a one period bill at t.  This is a discount price.
2.1   The Markov Equilibrium Concept.
We normalize prices by using consumption as a numeraire.  Given this, the optimization
problem of agent  k  has the following structure at all  t:  given I  - the history of all observables t
(2a)
subject to
(2b)        
(2c)   
Q  is a probability belief of agent k on all future variables which he does not know. Tok
enable us to compute equilibria we take the utility function agent  k  to be 
With this specification the Euler equations for agent  k  are
(3a)
(3b)  
Dt  1 
 Dtdt  1
1 , 1 	 1
1 	 1 , 1
7
k
t 

6
k
t
Dt
b kt 

B kt
Dt
c
1k
t 

C 1kt
Dt
c
2k
t1 

C 2kt1
Dt1
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The parameters of the model are selected to equal the values of the corresponding
estimates for the real economy.  We thus aim to calibrate the model and test its ability to generate
solutions which are of the same order of magnitudes as the observed endogenous variables.
(2.1a) The dividend process and the equilibrium map.  The simulation model is Markovian
with an exogenous process of dividends as specified in M&P [1985].  It takes the following form
(4) .
where {d  , t = 1, 2, ...} is a stationary and ergodic Markov process.  The state space of thet
process is  J  = {d  , d }  with   d  = 1.054  and  d  = .982  and a transition matrixD H  L      H      L
(5)
with 1 = .43.  Hence, over time agents experience a secular rise of dividends and it is therefore 
convenient to focus on growth rates.  To do that let 
 
  is the endowment/dividend ratio of agent  k  at date  t; 
   is the bill/dividend ratio of agent  k  at date  t;
   is the ratio of consumption when young to aggregate capital income;
 is the ratio of consumption when old to aggregate capital income;
We  assume that  7  = 7    for k = 1, 2  are constant,  =  7   + 7   then  (6  + 6 ) = D  t                        t   t   tk  k              1   2    1  2
 for all t .  We do not consider random endowments in part because production and labor markets
are not the focus of this paper and in part because of computational feasibility.  Now divide (2b)
D
1 	 k
t D
	k
t
c
1k
t 
 	 pt
k
t 	 qtb
k
t  7
k
c
2k
t1 
 
k
t ( pt1  1) 
b kt
dt1
	pt( c 1kt )
	k
 k EQ kt ( ( c
2k
t1 dt1)
	k ( pt11) dt1) | It ) 
 0
	 qt (c 1 kt )
	k
 k EQ kt ( (c
2 k
t  1 dt  1 )
	k | It ) 
 0
bkt 
 b
k
t ( pt , qt , dt , It )

k
t 
 
k
t (pt , qt , dt , It )

1
t  
2
t 
 1
b 1t  b
2
t 
 0
(pt , qt , (1t , b 1t ) , (2t , b 2t ) ,dt )
( (10 , b 10 
 0) (20 , b 20 
 0) )
(pt , qt , 1t , b 1t , 2t , b 2t , dt )
bkt 
 b
k
t ( pt , qt , dt , It ) kt 
 kt (pt , qt , dt , It )
(pt , qt )
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by D , (2c) by D , equation (3a) by   and equation (3b) by   to obtain, for  k = 1, 2t    t+1
(6a) ,   
              
(6b) ,
      
(6c) ,  
(6d) .
(6a) - (6d)  imply demand functions which take the general time dependent form, for k = 1, 2
(7a)
   
(7b)
   
Equilibrium requires the market clearing conditions 
(7c)
(7d)  ;
The equilibrium in (7a)-(7d) depends upon the beliefs of the agents and upon what they
condition on.  In this paper we restrict our attention to stable Markov equilibria.
Definition 6:  Beliefs (Q ,Q ) and a stochastic process { , t = 1, 2,...} 1 2
with initial portfolios  , and with true probability  $ constitute a 
stable Markov competitive equilibrium if 

K  satisfy conditions (7a) - (7d) at all dates t; 
(ii)   and  are independent of the history  I . t -1
(iii)  (Q , Q  , $)  are stable measures in the sense of definition 1.1  2
It follows from (7a)-(7d) that the price process { , t = 1, 2, ...} of a stable Markov
equilibrium is defined by an equilibrium sequence of maps 
pt
qt

 0t( dt )
(pt1 , qt1 , dt1 )
bkt 
 bk ( pt , qt , dt )

k
t 
 
k(pt , qt , dt )
pt
qt


ˆ0( dt )
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(7e)    
where the time dependence of the equilibrium map represents the potential time dependence of the
beliefs of agents.  In an REE, Q  = Q  = $  where $  is the true probability induced by (5) and by1  2
the stationary equilibrium map (7e).  In an REE states of beliefs of agents have no effect on prices
and all demand functions are time independent.  We review this particular equilibrium first. 
(2.1b) Stable Rational expectations equilibria.  In a stable Markov REE  Q  = Q  = $  and,1  2
deduced from (5), the probabilities of  in (6c) - (6d) are conditioned only on the
realized value of  d   It then follows that the demand functions must take the formt . 
(8a)
(8b) .
(8a)-(8b) and the market clearing conditions (7c)-(7d) imply a stationary equilibrium map
(9a) .
In the special case postulated in (5) the growth rate of dividends takes two values.  In this case
Equation (9a) shows that a stable Markov REE is a stationary equilibrium with two prices and
two optimal portfolios.
 2.2     The Structure of Beliefs and Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE)
Our brief review of the theory of RBE implies that under the Markov assumption and
given an economy with two agents, the equilibrium map takes the form
pt
qt

 0( dt , Q 1t , Q 2t )
(dt , Q 1t , Q 2t )
(F k1 , F k2 , F k3 , ... )
F kt
g kt
F kt 
 G
k
g kt
, t 
 1 , 2 ,...
Q ky k
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(7e1)
and hence the joint distribution of   will define the true equilibrium probability $.
We aim, in the rest of this paper, to construct a Markov equilibrium with a Markov stationary
measure m and since it will be a finite state process, it follows that the stationary measure m is
fully characterized by a transition matrix of prices which we denote by  
.
Our earlier review has also shown that if agent k adopts an RB  Q   which is different fromk
the stationary measure m, he must believe that the economic environment is non-stationarity. 
However, a non-stationary probability of a Markov process with finite number of states is fully
characterized by a time varying sequence of Markov matrixes  specifying that at
date t  the process is defined by the transition matrix  .  If the set of possible Markov matrices
is {G , G  , ..., G } the non-stationary probability Q   is represented by a time function   taking1  2   M k
values in {1, 2, ... , M} which defines the sequence of transition matrices  .
For a Markov Rational Belief  Q  which is represented by such a sequence of matrices it turns outk
that the complicating factor is the determination of the rationality of belief conditions which the
sequence of matrices must satisfy.  The method of "assessment variables" is our tractable tool to
describe the non stationarity of such RB and to develop the rationality conditions.
(2.2a) Assessment Variables and the State Space. Assessment variables are privately perceived
random variables {y  , t = 1, 2, ...} for  k = 1, 2  generated by the agents.  We assume here thattk
y  Y = {0, 1} and  Q  is defined as a probability on the joint process {(p , q , d , y ), t = 1, 2, ...}t                  t  t  t  tk       k             k
which is a Markov process, and the effective belief is , the conditional probability of Q  givenk
(pt1 ,qt1 ,dt1 ,ykt1 ) (pt , qt , dt , y kt )
bkt 
 bk ( pt , qt , dt , y kt )

k
t 
 
k(pt , qt , dt , y kt )

1(pt , qt , dt , y 1t )  2(pt , qt , dt , y 2t ) 
 1
b1(pt , qt , dt , y 1t )  b 2( pt , qt , dt , y 2t ) 
 0 .
pt
qt

 0
( dt , y 1t , y 2t )
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the sequence y .  Hence, under Q  and Q ,  the assessment variables are jointly distributed with thek     1  2
real market variables and hence their distribution may depend upon observed economic variables. 
Hence, conditioning on  y   alters the  predictions, by agent k, of future economic variables.tk
From an economic perspective, assessment variables are privately perceived parameters
indicating how an agent interprets current information and hence are tools for the description of
stable and non-stationary processes (see Kurz and Schneider [1996] pages 491-495 and Nielsen
[1996] on this point).  These variables have purely subjective meaning and should not be taken to
be objective and transferable "information".  An agent does not know the values of the assessment
variables of other agents and would not understand their meaning even if he knew them.  Their
impact on the real economy arises from the fact that conditioning on them by the agents alters
their probability beliefs about future values of economic variables.  We explain this point now.
(i) Assessment variables and the equilibrium map.  In (6c) - (6d) agent  k  uses the probability of
 conditional on .   It follows from our Markov assumptions
that the demands of agent  k  for stocks and bills are time-independent functions of  the form

C

D 
Consequently we can write the market clearing conditions as
(10c)
(10d)   
The system (10c)-(10d) implies that the equilibrium map of this economy takes the form
(11) .
(dt , y 1t , y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t ) (Q 1t , Q 2t )
(pt , qt )
(pt1 , qt1 )
(pt , qt )
(dt , y 1t , y 2t )
(pt , qt ) (pt1 , qt1 )
(dt , y 1t , y 2t ) (dt1 , y 1t1 , y 2t1 )
(dt , y 1t , y 2t )
(pt , qt ) (pt1 , qt1 )
 
The choice of the equilibrium dynamics being generated by a fixed, stationary, matrix is a matter of4
convenience and simplicity in this paper.  In general the process { , t = 1, 2, ...} could have been
selected to be any stable process with a Markov stationary measure induced by the empirical distribution.  In
such a case the fixed transition matrix  
  would characterize only the stationary measure of the equilibrium
dynamics rather than be the matrix of the true probability of the equilibrium dynamics of prices.  For
simplicity we avoid this additional complication.
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The equilibrium map (11) reveals that prices are determined by the exogenous shock d   and byt
the "state of belief" represented by .
To clarify the role of the assessment variables in (11) note that in (10a) - (10b) we
specified that the demand functions are not time dependent and hence the assessment variables 
 completely determine the conditional probabilities .  From the assumption of
a Markov equilibrium it follows that [   determines completely the transition matrix from 
V
M
to  which is used by agent k at date t.  Moreover, [  { 0 , 1}  implies that the agent
V
M
has
 at most two Markov matrices and at each date the value taken by his assessment variable
determines which of these two the agent uses.  We shall later define the beliefs in such a manner
that "1" is a state of optimism relative to  m while  "0" is a state of pessimism relative to m.
(11) implies that there are at most  8  distinct price vectors  that may be observed,
corresponding to the  8  combinations of  .  The Markov assumption implies that the
true equilibrium transition probability from the 8 prices to the  8  prices  is
determined by the transition probabilities from  to  .   For simplicity
we select the joint process { , t = 1, 2, ...} to be a stationary Markov process with a
transition matrix 
.  This implies  that the true equilibrium process of prices has a fixed transition4
probability from to defined by 
.  The agents discover 
 from the data and use
it to construct the stationary measure.  However, they do not know that 
 is the true equilibrium
(y 1t , y 2t )
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(pt , qt ) (pt1 , qt1 )
 
By studying the relationship between prices and d  agents discover the partition in the long run data.5 t
This happens to be the truth at all dates but an agent may not believe it.  Instead he may form a rational belief
about this variable. The issue has little significance to our study and we chose the simpler assumption.
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probability and for this reason they form RB relative to 
 
.  Indeed, the fact that they form RB
using is what rationalizes  
  to be the equilibrium probability of the implied RBE.
(ii) Assessment variables and the state space.  The state space for prices is  (J ×Y×Y)  but oneD 
may also consider the state space to be  S   where  S is the index set S = {1, 2, ..., 8}.  We can
then define a new equilibrium map 0 between the indices of prices (i.e., a number from 1 to 8
rather than by t ) and the states of dividends and assessment variables by
(12) .
d   is the "high dividends" and  d  is the "low dividends" states. (11)-(12) highlight the idea of H        L
Endogenous Uncertainty showing that the volatility of prices depends upon the states of belief.
(iii) The exogenous variables.  A belief Q   was defined as a probability on the space of sequencesk
{( p , q , d , y  ), t = 1, 2, ...} but we have also seen that Q  was defined by a selection of transitiont  t  t  tk             k
matrices from to .  This appears to ignore the probability of the exogenous
variable  d .  To see that this is not so, consider the map  0  in (12).  The probability of d   equalst H
the probability of prices {1, 2, 3 ,4} and the probability of  d   equals the probability of prices {5,L
6, 7, 8}.  Thus, the distribution of  d  is defined by the partition of the state space.  Agentst 
discover this partition and for simplicity we have assumed that they believe it to be the truth.  5
1 F1  (1 	 1 )F2 
 
 , 2 G1  ( 1 	 2 ) G2 
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(2.2b)  The Rationality of Belief Conditions.  A Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) is a stable
equilibrium in which agents hold RB.  To establish an RBE we need to construct an equilibrium
process which is stable, from which agents compute the empirical distribution.  The
 
rationality
conditions require the beliefs of the agents to imply a stationary measure which is equal to the one
computed from the data.  We explain that in our model, these concepts are significantly simplified.
Although beliefs Q   are probabilities on sequences ]
R  S  F  [  V   _ thek      M
V V V V
probabilities used in (6c)-(6d) are Q ((& )| y ), which are Q   conditional on y  of agent k.  Hence,k   k    k    k
the rationality of belief conditions must apply to Q ((& )| y ).  These conditions require thatk   k
(i)  Q ((& )| y ) is a stable measure;k   k
(ii) the stationary measure of Q ((& )| y ) equals the probability on sequences induced by 
. k   k
Since Q ((& )| y )  is represented by two Markov matrices, we need to specify the joint distributionk   k
of (p  ,q  , y )  and the rationality conditions which are consistent with these matrices.  To that endt t  tk
we use the "Conditional Stability Theorem" (Kurz and Schneider [1996] pp. 492 - 494).  It says
that if the probability Q  of the joint process]
R  S  [ , t = 1, 2, ...} is stable, then a conditionalk    M
V V V
probability Q ((& )| y )  of  Q   on  [ ,  is a stable probability on ]
R  S  V   _ and thek   k     k    M
V        V V
stationary measure QH 3 (
& ^ [  is the marginal of  Q   on 
R S  obtained by integrating on y .M M       k        k
V V
To simplify the above procedure we assume that the marginal distribution of  Q   on [   isk   M
V
i.i.d. with 3 ][  _     for k = 1, 2.  By the Conditional Stability Theorem Q   and  Q   areM M              1    2
V M
characterized by two pairs of matrices, (F , F )  for agent 1 and (G , G ) for agent 2, such that:1  2       1  2
(13a)  
 Q  for agent 1: adopt   F     if    [   Q   for agent 2: adopt  G    if    [  1                2              1        V        1       V
            adopt   F     if    [              adopt  G    if    [  .2        V              2       V                     
(13b)    .
(y 1t , y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t ) (y 1t ,y 2t )
(y 1t , y 2t )
dt 
 d
H dt 
 d
L
 An RBE is not a sunspot equilibrium.  We note first that assessment variables are not observables,6
the joint distribution of   is not known and the agents do not have the structural knowledge needed to
invert an equilibrium map.  Hence an RBE cannot be a fully revealing equilibrium.  But the issue is deeper. 
Even if we assumed, for the sake of discussion, that  is observable and that the agents know the
equilibrium map, the RBE is not a sunspot equilibrium because the "sunspot" variable  alters the
real economy.  That is, for the RBE to be a sunspot equilibrium the different values of  must be
associated with exactly the same fundamentals of the economy.  This is not the case in an RBE.  For example,
in the "sunspot" state (1, 1) the von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences of the agents are defined by the
probabilities (F  , G  ) while in the "sunspot" state (0, 1) they are defined by (F  , G ).  These changes in the1  1             2  1
fundamentals of the economy show that endogenous uncertainty has real effects on the economy induced by
the states of belief  .  We also note that  given each state of belief , the equilibrium at date  t 
is unique.
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An intuitive interpretation starts by noting that these rational agents believe that the price-
dividend process is not stationary and their beliefs are parameterized by .   (13b) implies
that the sequence of matrices which they adopt is compatible with the true price process ( i.e.
generating the same empirical distribution) which is a Markov process with transition 
.      is1
the frequency at which agent 1 uses matrix F   and     is the frequency at which agent 2 uses1    2
matrix  G .  This leads to a formal definition of the equilibrium which we construct below:1
Definition 7:  A Markov Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE) is a Markov Competitive Equilibrium 
in which the (Q  , Q ) are defined by (13a) and satisfy the rationality conditions (13b) .1  2           6
We observe that an RBE is simply an incomplete Radner [1972] equilibrium in which (i) the
agents do not know the equilibrium map, (ii) the agents hold Rational Belief rather than arbitrary
beliefs, and (iii) the state space is endogenously expanded to include the states of belief. 
(2.2c) The Stationary Measure. We now assemble the conditions which  
 must satisfy.  The
event  is equivalent to the event that prices {1, 2, 3, 4} occur and the event is

 

1A, (1 	 1 )A
(1 	 1 ) B, 1B
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equivalent to the event that prices {5, 6, 7, 8} occur.  Now, (5) specified the dividend process and
since prices in the RBE are functions of (d , y , y ), the marginal of  
 with respect to  d   mustt  t  t            t1  2 
equal the dividend matrix in (5).  Similarly with respect to (y  , y ) : the marginal of   
  witht   t1  2
respect to each of the y   must be i.i.d. with probability   .t         kk
Note that each agent has a marginal distribution on his own assessment variable, hence the
i.i.d. requirement on the marginals of  
 with respect to each  y    is a consistency conditiontk
between the market observations and what each agent perceives.  No such conditions apply to the
joint distribution of the assessments.  This joint effect of the assessment variables, as distinct from
the individually perceived effect, is that part of   
  which describes the externalities of beliefs in
the market performance.  These externalities cannot be found in each of the marginal distributions
of the beliefs  Q .   They are, however, reflected in the equilibrium process.  They describe thek
interaction among the agents resulting from communication in society, the manner in which agents
influence each other and how the real economic variables (i.e. dividends) affect this interaction.
In sum, the matrix  
  must satisfy the following:
(14a) the marginal on  y    is  i.i.d. with P{y  = 1} =       for  k = 1, 2;t        t     kk       k
(14b) the marginal on  d    is Markov as specified by the dividend process (5);t
The family of matrices which satisfy these conditions is limited.  Our main criterion for
selecting the following matrix 
 from this family is simplicity and flexibility in parameterization.
(15)
where  A  and  B  are  4×4 matrices which are characterized by the  10  parameters  ,  , and  1  2
( a, b)  where  a = (a , a , a , a ),  b = (b , b , b , b ):1  2  3  4     1  2  3  4
A 

a1 , 1 	 a1 , 2 	 a1 , 1  a1 	 1 	 2
a2 , 1 	 a2 , 2 	 a2 , 1  a2 	 1 	 2
a3 , 1 	 a3 , 2 	 a3 , 1  a3 	 1 	 2
a4 , 1 	 a4 , 2 	 a4 , 1  a4 	 1 	 2
, B 

b1, 1 	 b1, 2 	 b1, 1  b1 	 1 	 2
b2 , 1 	 b2, 2 	 b2, 1  b2 	 1 	 2
b3 , 1 	 b3, 2 	 b3, 1  b3 	 1 	 2
b4 , 1 	 b4, 2 	 b4, 1  b4 	 1 	 2
(y 1t  1 , y 2t  1 ) P{ykt 
 1} 
 k
{ykt , t 
 1, 2 , ...}

µ
Aj 
 (aj , 1 	 aj , 2 	 aj , 1  aj 	 (1  2 ) )
B j 
 ( bj , 1 	 bj , 2 	 bj , 1  bj 	 (1  2 ) )
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(16)  
If A g B then the distribution of  depends upon d  . (16) implies that t
for k = 1, 2 as required in (14a).  Note, however, that although each process 
for  k = 1, 2 is very simple, the joint process {(d  , y  , y ), t = 1, 2,...} may be complex: it permitst  t   t1  2
correlation among the three central variables and these effects are important.  If we set   =   =.51  2
and a  = b  = .25 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 then all correlations are eliminated.  In this case the stationaryi  i
distribution  (% , % , ... ,% )  implied  in (16) is  %  = .125  for all i.  If, in addition, the agents1  2   8         i
adopt the stationary measure as their belief (i.e. F  = G  =  
), then we have exactly an REE.1  1
For simplicity of parameterization, we set in almost all simulations the parameter values 
  =   = .57 ,  a = (a  g a  = a  = a  )  and  b = (b  g b  = b  = b ).  It is clear, however, that there1  2       1  2  3  4       1  2  3  4
are natural restrictions which the parameters must satisfy and these will be discussed later.  We
specify now the family of RBE which we use in the simulations.
(2.2d) Rational Beliefs: the Family of Optimism/Pessimism Beliefs.  We use two parameters 
and   to select two pairs of matrices: (F , F ) of agent 1 and (G , G ) of agent 2 satisfying the1  2      1  2
rationality conditions (13b).  To do that denote the row vectors of  A  and  B  by:
 j = 1, 2, 3, 4
j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
With this notation we define the 4 matrix functions of a real number  z  as follows:
A1(z) 

z A 1
z A 2
z A 3
z A 4
, A2(z) 

(1 	1z )A 1
(1 	1z )A 2
(1 	1z )A 3
(1 	1z )A 4
B1(z) 

zB 1
zB 2
zB 3
zB 4
, B2(z) 

(1 	 (1 	1 ) z )B 1
(1 	 (1 	1 ) z )B 2
(1 	 (1 	1 ) z )B 3
(1 	 (1 	1 ) z )B 4
F1 

1A1 ( ) , A2 ( )
(1 	 1 )B1 ( ) , B2 ( )
G1 

1A1 (µ ) , A2 (µ )
(1 	 1 )B1 (µ ) , B2 (µ )
F2 

1
1 	 1
( 
 	 1 F1 ) , G2 

1
1 	 2
( 
 	 2 G1 )
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(17)     ,  .
Finally we define
(18) .
By the rationality conditions (13b), .
To motivate this construction, note that the parameters    and  µ  are proportional
revisions of the conditional probabilities of states (1, 2, 3, 4) and (5, 6, 7, 8) relative to  
.   > 1
and µ > 1 imply increased probabilities of states (1, 2, 3, 4) in matrix F  of agent 1 and matrix G1      1
of agent 2 where the first four prices are associated with the states when  d  = d .  Since these aret H
the states of the higher prices,   > 1  implies that agent 1 is optimistic about high prices at  t + 1. 
Similarly for µ > 1.  In all simulations below we set    1 and  µ  1  and hence the assessment
variables  y  have a simple interpretation: when  y  = 1 agent  k  is optimistic (relative to 
 )  at t          tk         k
t  about high prices at t + 1.  The special case of   = 1 ,   µ = 1 and  a  = b  = .25  identifies ani  i
REE.  Finally, it turns out that the concepts of "agreement" and "disagreement" between the
agents are useful.   We then say that the agents agree if   y  =  y   and disagree if  y  g  y .t
   
t
      
t
   
t
1
   
2
      
1
   
2
(2.2e) Stable Markov RBE. Conditions (6c)-(6d) require an agent to forecast prices (p  , q ). t + 1  t + 1
A rational agent can perform this task since there is a set of  8  prices {(p  , q )} that cant + 1  t + 1
occur at t + 1  and all agents know this set from past history.  We use the index set  S to define
equilibrium consumptions, portfolios and prices in terms of the transitions from state  s  to state  j 
Q k( j | s , y ks )
y ks
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in the set S.  To state the equilibrium conditions in these terms denote by  agent  k’s
probability of price state  j  given price state  s  and the value of  which he perceives at state s 
but
 under the competitive assumption that  k  knows neither the map (12) nor the fact that he
influences prices.  Conditions (6) - (7) are then restated for  k = 1, 2  and  j, s = 1, 2, ..., 8:
(19a)
(19b)
(19c)
(19d)
(19e)
(19f)
The constructed Markov RBE is then a solution of equations (19a)-(19f) for feasible parameters. 
(i) The assumption of Competitive Equilibrium. (19a)-(19f) shows that in our RBE agents are
assumed to act competitively.  However, this assumption is subtle and needs to be clarified since
from the equilibrium map (12) it is also clear that when we have a finite number of agents, the
belief of each agent has an effect on equilibrium prices.  Competitive behavior means that an agent
 is required to disregard his effect on prices.  To see what this entails observe from (12) that agent
1 uses matrix F  when  but during those dates only prices {1, 2, 5, 6} are realized contrary1
to the belief of agent 1 that all prices could be realized.  If the agent is allowed to take into
account his effect on prices, he would use this information in formulating his belief and that would
be part of the rationality of belief conditions.  In fact, the assumption of Competitive Behavior
means that the agent is asked to ignore these facts.  For example, it would be a violation of
Competitive Behavior if the belief  Q  of agent 1 incorporated the forecast at  t  that with1 
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 It is useful to comment on the difference between our treatment and Kurz and Beltratti [1997]. 7
The earlier paper introduced the vectors  and   and allowed
the agents to
 
select 16 parameters.  This means that the agents select  to vary with prices.  Since
there are only two agents in the model they obviously have an effect on prices but are required to act
competitively and ignore such effect.  By allowing the agents to select different   for different s, we
permit the agents to take into account their effect on prices and thus violate the condition of anonymity (see
Kurz [1998] for more details).  Our procedure of selecting a single parameter   ensures anonymity.
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probability 1 only prices {1, 2, 5, 6} would be realized at date t + 1  if  .
(ii) Feasibility conditions on the model parameters. There is a large number of restrictions on the
model parameters.  The parameters , ,  must satisfy
(20)
.
Similarly, the selection of   ( , µ) is restricted by  10  inequality constraints:
(21)
           .
The RBE’s in our simulations are solutions of the 192 equations (19a) - (19f) in prices and
quantities which satisfy the feasibility constraints (20) - (21).   The particular family of RBE which
we shall study in the simulations is drastically simplified by the following criteria:
(i)    a single intensity variable   ;7
(ii)   ;
(iii)   for two parameters (c  , c  );1  2
1 and 2
1 and 2
1 , 2 1 and 2
)p
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(iv)  in the realistic interval [2.5, 3.5] (see Kurz and Beltratti [1997], pp. 290 -
294) ;  are in the empirically plausible interval [.85 , .95].
We thus observe that once we select realistic values for , , equilibrium is
uniquely determined by the four parameters :  ,  , c  , c  .1  2
(iii) The model unit of time.  The selection of discount rates around .9 implies that we calibrate
our model to annual data and we later discuss extensively whether the OLG environment is
appropriate for our purposes.  Here we note that since in our model the “state of belief” of an
agent changes over time, a unit of time of one year implies that the fluctuations in the market
distribution of beliefs is a rather slow process.  The model thus aims to capture the changes over
relatively long market swings of bull and bear markets.  These changes do not occur over short
periods of days or weeks but rather over years.  
 3.  Endogenous Uncertainty and Volatility: Simulation Results
 We now examine the model’s success in simulating the real economy.  For this reason we
first review the empirical averages of the key seven variables of the model in the U.S.:
p   -  the long term price/dividend ratio.  M&P [1985] used the data base compiled by Shiller
[1981] for 1889-1978.  We used the updated version of the same Shiller’s data base for
1889 - 1998 and estimated this variable to be  22.84; 
 -  the standard deviation of the price/dividend ratio p.  For the period 1889 - 1998 we
estimated it to be  6.48 using the updated version of Shiller’s [1981] data base;
R   -  the average risky return on equities was estimated by M&P [1985] to be  6.98%.  Using the
updated Shiller [1981] data for 1989 - 1998 our estimate is 8.34% suggesting that
)R
)
r F
pt 
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6.98%is on the low side.  We thus record the mean risky rate to be around  8.00%;
 -  the standard deviation of R was estimated by M&P [1985] to be 16.67%.  Using the
updated data for 1989 - 1998 our estimate is 18.08%;  
r  -    M&P [1985] estimated the mean riskless interest rate to be .80% for 1889 - 1978 based onF
the 90 day treasury bill rate for 1931 - 1978.  For 1889 - 1931 one may use various
alternate securities.  We offer no independent estimate and accept the view that the
evidence places the mean riskless rate around  1.00%.  Some evidence suggest that this
low rate has prevailed mostly since the Great Depression and that prior to 1931 the rate
was higher (see Siegel [1994]);
 -  the standard deviation of  r  was estimated by M&P [1985] to have an average of 5.67% F
during the period of 1889 - 1978;
'   -  the premium of equity return over the riskless rate.  With the mean value of  r  set at around F
1.00% and with the mean value of  R estimated at  8.00%,  we conclude that the empirical
evidence places the mean equity premium around  7.00%;
3.1  The Scaling Problem of OLG Models
Before proceeding we resolve the issue of scaling an RBE.  The problem arises from the
fact that in an OLG economy agents live two periods and the young purchase from the old the
capital stock of the economy using their labor endowment.  Hence, equilibrium   depends
upon the labor endowment of the young.  Since in the real economy it takes a generation for the
capital stock to change ownership from the old to the young, an OLG model has a problem. If the
labor income of the young is of the same order of magnitude as dividend income in the economy,
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the model could not generate a price\dividend ratio of 23.  Hence, the young’s labor endowment
must be a multiple of  D   in any one year in order to attain an equilibrium price\dividend ratiot
equal to the historical average of about 23.  To highlight the point, Table 1 below presents the
equilibrium values of (p, r  , R , ') in a sequence of REEs in which  take different F
Table 1:  REE Solutions for Varying Values of   
p 11.39 13.35 17.26 21.17 22.15 23.13 24.11 25.09
r 10.24%   8.93%   7.21%   6.13%   5.92%   5.72%   5.54%   5.38%F 
R 10.75%   9.44%   7.71%   6.62%   6.41%   6.21%   6.04%   5.87%
'     .51%     .51%     .50%     .49%     .49%     .49%     .49%     .49%
values.  Other parameter choices in Table 1 are: a  = b  = .25 for all i;  ;i  i
;  .  Table 1 shows that variations in the endowment of the young acts
as a scaling factor which determines the level of prices (p , q) and hence the average returns on
 
securities.  When  7  reaches the range of 24,  p  is close to 23 and the mean risky return is
6.21%.  Both means are close to the historical average.  Our procedure is then to select the value
of the endowment which results in a price\dividend ratio of approximately  p = 23.  For the RBE
below, this value is  7 = 26.  We view this as a pure scaling of the OLG model and in this sense
the model does not reproduce the empirical evidence of  p = 23, it is scaled to that level.
The problem of scaling the OLG model raises a deeper question, which may have already
occurred to the reader: why should we expect the unrealistic OLG model to be an appropriate
model for the study of market volatility?  Since the discount rate is around  10%, the unit of time
is a year and hence the model length of life of an agent is not an approximation of real human
work life.  Our answer to this question consists of two parts.  First, note the fact that once the
7
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 7
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 24
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model was scaled, the predictions of the REE of the model reproduced very closely the
predictions of the M& P [1985] model of infinitely lived agents.  This analytical fact is the main
reason why we have postponed the discussion of the question at hand until this point.
Turning to the second answer we note first that the Euler equations of an OLG agent are
exactly the same as the Euler equations of an infinitely lived agent.  The differences between these
two sets of equations are the definitions of the budget constraint, their consumption and wealth. 
Since our model assumptions imply that aggregate consumption is proportional to total dividends,
it follows that the growth rates of dividends and aggregate consumption are identically the same
in the OLG and in the M& P [1985] infinite horizon  models, and obey the exogenous Markov
process defined by (5).  Given this fact we need to assess why might one expect the models to
have different predictions.  If the equity premium and other "anomalies" in financial market are
determined by real factors such as the horizon of the agents’ optimization or by the life cycle
saving patterns over the very long horizon, then the OLG model and the infinite horizon models
would yield drastically different results.  Alternatively, if the characteristics of market volatility
under study are essentially driven by expectations, then, given the Markov structure of the model,
it would not make any difference whether the agents trade many times over their own life-time or
only once: their expectations for each date at a time will drive the results.  Hence, if our theory is
right and the phenomena under study are primarily driven by the distribution of beliefs, then the
OLG model is an entirely useful model for the study of market volatility.
3.2  REE Simulations: Matching the M&P [1985] Results
Focusing on the case  we study further the REE defined by the parameter
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values : a  = b  = .25 for all  i ;   ;  and .  Thei  i
results in Table 2 represent what M&P [1985] introduced as "the equity premium puzzle."
  In the
       
Table 2:  REE Results
variable    REE Empirical 
Record
    p 23.13   23
   )     .069     6.48p
   R   6.21%     8.00%
   )   4.12%   18.08%R
   r   5.72%     1.00%F
      .88%     5.67%
   '     .49%     7.00%
narrow sense, the puzzle is the observation that the model prediction of  '  is  .49%  while the
historical average is 7.00%.  As in M& P [1985], this REE predicts reasonably well the mean rate
of return on equities but errs in predicting a riskless rate of 5.72% when the empirical average is
1.00%.  An inspection of Table 2 reveals that our OLG model reproduces very well the M&P
[1985] results.  Note, that the equity premium is not the only problem which the REE of the
model presents;  all volatility measures in the table are low relative to the historical record.  The
empirical value of   is 94 times larger than the REE prediction, the value of  is more than 4
times larger than the REE prediction and the value of    is over 6 times larger than the model
prediction.  One objective of Kurz [1994] and of the papers in Kurz [1997] was to demonstrate
that the theory of RBE points to Endogenous Uncertainty as the explanation of  high volatility
propagated within the market by the beliefs of the agents.  Before exploring the volatility of the
RBE we make two additional observations about Table 2:
(i) The model prediction of  is downward biased (in the REE and RBE) since we
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assume, with M&P [1985], that dividends and GNP are proportional.  Under the realistic
assumption that profits are more volatile than GNP the model predictions of    would
become larger, but not large enough to alter the general result for the REE in Table 2.
(ii) The historical value of    estimated to be  5.67%  is downward biased relative to the
model assumptions since during the second half of the 20th century monetary policy
tended to stabilize short term rates.  Such a policy is not in the model.  Indeed, there is
some evidence that before the Great Depression   was substantially higher than  5.67%.
3.3  A Family of RBE with Optimists/Pessimists 
We study a family of "optimists\pessimists" RBE.  For this family we scale the model by
selecting   and the four parameters which characterize this family are as follows:
(i) . Agent k is optimistic when  at which time he adjusts the probabilities of
high prices at  t +1  by factor of 1.7542 which is approximately the maximal feasible value.
(ii) .  In the majority of dates (57%) an agent is optimistic but only 43% of the time
he is pessimistic.  In a large economy this means that the optimists are always in the majority but
this also means that the pessimists are more intense in their outlook than the optimists;
(iii) Correlation of belief: a = b with  a  = b  = c  =.50 and   for i = 2, 3, 4.  These1  1  1
parameters regulate the correlation of the states of beliefs of the agents.  A random variable which
sums up the state of belief is L ,  taking three values: (i)  if   is the state OOt
when both agents are optimistic; (ii)   is the state PP when both agents are
pessimistic and  (iii)  is the state DIS when the agents disagree.  The stochastic
process { L  , t = 1, 2, ...} is a  Markov process with the transition matrix:t
( OO)t
( PP)t
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(OO) (PP) (DIS)t + 1 t + 1 t + 1
   .50   .36    .14
   .14     0    .86
(DIS)t    .14     0    .86
The condition   for   i = 2, 3, 4 means that if at  t  the state is PP or DIS, at t +1
the state must be OO or DIS; PP cannot occur at  t + 1.    implies that total
optimism at t can be followed by any state at t+1.  Hence, the correlation takes the form:
(i)  unanimous optimism at t may lead to any state of belief at  t + 1; 
 (ii) unanimous pessimism or disagreement at  t  prevents total pessimism at  t + 1.
The emergence of asymmetries in an otherwise symmetric economy is the key to understanding
the structure of volatility.  Note that the transition matrix of the states of belief is not symmetric
and to understand the results caused by this matrix recall that price movements are caused by the
joint movement of  d   and ( ).  Asymmetry in the transition matrix of the states of belief willt
thus translate into asymmetry in the dynamics of stock prices.  We explore the exact pattern later.
We now report the simulation results for  from  2.5  to  3.5 and   
from .85 to .95 hence these results apply to a reasonably wide range of values of    and .  Table
3 shows that for this parameterization, the model predicts well the historical record.  Comparing
the results in Tables  3 with the empirical record, we note that the mean risky return  R  is close to
the average of 8.00% and its standard deviation    is close to 18.08%; the riskless rate is within
range of the average of 1.00%, and the equity premium is close to the average of 7.00%.  The
two moments  and  exhibit small deviations from the historical record: (i) the  record of   
is 6.48% while the model predictions are smaller, around  2.5% - 3.4%, and (ii) the record of 
)
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Table 3: Results for RBE with optimists\pessimists
 = 2.5  = 2.75  = 3.00  = 3.25  = 3.50
 = .85     p   23.06   23.12   23.19  23.26  23.34
   )     2.53     2.78    3.00    3.20    3.36p
   R     7.85%     8.19%    8.51%    8.80%   9.05%
   )   18.76%   20.63%  22.27%  23.69%  24.89%R
   r     2.36%     1.79%    1.22%      .66%      .12%F
    14.62%   16.12%  17.41%  18.48%  19.35%
   '     5.49%     6.40%    7.29%    8.14%    8.93%
 = .90     p   23.36   23.38  23.43  23.48  23.54
   )     2.52     2.77    2.99    3.18    3.34      p
   R     7.75%     8.08%    8.39%    8.68%    8.93%   
   )   18.48%   20.32%  21.94%  23.35%  24.55%R
   r     2.37%     1.81%    1.25%      .71%      .18%   F
    14.40%   15.89%  17.17%  18.24%  19.11% 
   '     5.38%     6.27%    7.14%    7.97%    8.75%
=.95     p   23.64   23.63  23.66  23.69  23.74
   )     2.51     2.76    2.97    3.16    3.28p
   R     7.65%     7.98%    8.29%    8.57%    8.61%
   )   18.22%   20.03%  21.64%  23.03%  23.40%   R
   r     2.37%     1.83%    1.29%      .75%      .04%   F
    14.20%   15.67%  16.95%  18.02% 19.04%
   '     5.28%     6.15%    7.00%    7.82%    8.57%
 is 5.67% while the model predictions are
 higher, around  14.2%- 19.4%.  Both predictions are of
the correct order of magnitudes of the record, and the sizes and signs of the deviations are
explained by the two model biases noted at the end of the previous section 3.2.
3.4   Interpreting the Propagation Mechanism of the RBE 
Why is the RBE able to explain the data?  Since an RBE has a propagation mechanism for
market volatility, what is the economic interpretations of the parameter choices and why do they
enable the model to explain the record?  A skeptical view could suggest that even the tight space
of parameters specified in Section (2.2e) is sufficiently large for the success of the model to be a
1 and 2
1 and 2
1
c2
c1
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38
chance event.  We revisit this issue in Section 4 when we discuss some testable implications of the
RBE theory and experimental methods of doing so.   Here we focus on three main facts:
(A) We use only two key parameters to explains a long array of moments and diverse market
volatility phenomena.  Moreover, only a very small neighborhood of parameters enables the
RBE’s prediction to matches the empirical record;
(B) There is no other neighborhood of feasible parameters defining RBE which match the data.
(C)  The values of ( =   ,  = µ) entail a simple economic interpretation: in the RBE optimists1  2
are in the majority but the intensity of the pessimists is stronger than the intensity of the optimists.
We start by the examination of a small neighborhood mentioned in fact (A).  In Table 4 we
report the results of varying the values of the parameters   over the range of .56, .57
and .58.  The results are sensitive to variations in the values of   =    and of   = µ.   Note that1  2
the restrictions on parameters in (20) - (21) show that small changes in , require change
of other parameters in accord with the feasibility conditions.  For example, if    is changed from
.57 to .58, the maximal value of   which is feasible changes to 1.7241, the value of   to .15 but
the value of   remains equal to .50.  In all cases  = .90 and   = 3.25. 
Moving on to fact (B) we observe that  there is no other neighborhood in the parameter
space yielding predictions which are simultaneously close to the empirical record.  Many model
parameters generate volatility of prices and returns.  However, as we move away from the small
neighborhood under discussion, the model fails to generate some predictions which are essential
components of the empirical record.  The reason for this fact is that the model’s ability to explain
the record is the result of specific asymmetries, discussed below, which are unique to this 
neighborhood.  Given parameter values of  for k = 1, 2  at reasonably realistic values,
1 1 1
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 In reference to the discussion in Section 1 we note that some who oppose  the use of heterogenous beliefs8
have argued that such models allow for too many equilibria and hence give a researcher too much freedom in explaining
any empirical phenomena.  The conclusion here shows that this is a superficial argument since the isolation of a small
neighborhood in the parameter space which is compatible with the historical record acts exactly as identification in any
econometric model.  The  existence of such a set of parameters arises directly from the rationality conditions of the RBE
and this fact provides added support for the RBE theory.
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Table 4: Results for the Parameter Neighborhood
= .56 = .57 = .58
= .56     p  23.56  23.59  23.97
   )    2.69    2.79    2.11p
   R    7.95%    8.09%    7.19%
   )  19.86%  20.60%  15.84%R
   r    3.32%    1.56%    1.41%F
  17.09%  16.42%  12.12%
   '    4.63%    6.53%    5.78%
= .57     p  23.59  23.48  23.90
   )    2.79    3.18    2.22p
   R    8.09%    8.68%    7.31%
   )  20.60%  23.35%  16.52%R
   r    1.56%      .71%      .92%F
  16.42%  18.24%  12.70%
   '    6.53%    7.97%    6.39%
= .58     p  23.97  23.90  23.87       
   )    2.11    2.22 1.94p
   R    7.19%    7.31%    7.00%
   )  15.84%  16.52%  14.35%R
   r    1.41%      .92%    1.89%F
  12.12%  12.70%  10.96%
   '    5.78%    6.39%    5.11%
 the small size of the  neighborhood of the other four parameter is a striking fact! This suggests
that the RBE offers a unique explanation of the historical record  which we now explore.8
We thus turn to (C), which is the economic interpretation of the family of RBE defined by
the parameters , , c  and c .  Recall that   means that both agents are optimistic in1  2
57% of the dates.  The second parameter is  = 1.7542, which is approximately the maximal ratio
( ( p1 , q1 ) , ( p2 , q2 ) , ( p3 , q3 ) , ( p4 , q4 ) )
dt
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by which an optimist at t  adjusts the probability of at  t + 1. 
To see the implication of this choice recall the transition matrix (5) for the growth rate of   and
the feasibility conditions (21).  In the neighborhood of  , we have  = 1 -1 =.57 and
  
the binding feasibility constraints are   , .  Suppose that agent 1 is an
optimist using F .  As    in  F  rises, the rationality conditions  require a1         1 
downward adjustment of the probability of  in the pessimistic
matrix  F .  Although the changes of the probabilities in  F  are made to correspond to the change2           2
of probabilities in F , the rationality conditions, which regulate the relation between them, induce1
a fundamental asymmetry between the intensities of the two.
To explain the asymmetry in intensities, note that the matrix in (5) implies that almost the
maximal feasible value of   is reached at 1.7542 when some probabilities in  F   are close to 0. 2
Symmetry appears to dictate a  correspondence between the 0  entries in F  and the entries of  1 2
in F .  At  ( ,  = 1.7542)  this symmetry does not hold.  If   is the (ij) entry of  F , 1          
    
           1
then  for  j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and if    is the (ij) entry of  F ,  then  .  In2
the neighborhood of  and  = 1.7542 we have the following asymmetric conclusion:
(22a) For all       i = 1, 2, ..., 8,              for  j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
(22b) Only for    i = 5, 6, 7, 8,               for  j = 5, 6, 7, 8.
(22a) says that in the neighborhood,  pessimistic agents are almost certain that a recession will
occur at date  t + 1.  This extreme degree of pessimism holds for all states of the economy at date
t.  Now, (22b) says that optimistic agents at date t are almost certain that a recession will not
occur at  t + 1 only if at  t  the economy is in a recession (i.e. d  = d ) .  If the economy is in ant L
expansion mode at  t,  the optimistic agent thinks that the probability of a recession at t + 1 is
y 1t and y
2
t
(y 1t , y 2t )
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about  25%.  We thus view the pessimists in this configuration as being
 more intensely pessimistic
than the optimists and because of this difference in intensity, they have a greater effect on the
security markets.  Observe that the asymmetry discussed here
 results from the rationality of belief
conditions and hence it is an essential characteristic of an RBE.
We finally turn to the interpretation of the parameters a = b = (.50 , .14, .14, .14). These
regulate the correlation between defined by the transition matrix of the states of belief
which impacts the dynamics of prices.  The correlation of   implies that bull and bear
markets are asymmetric.  For the market to transit from the lowest price of the crash states (in the
recession d = d and the state of belief in DIS) to the highest prices of the bull market statesL 
(which occur in PP)  it needs to take several steps:
 
it cannot go
 directly from the low to the high
prices.  The opposite, however, is possible since at the bull market states there is a positive
probability of reaching the crash states
 in one step.  Thus a bull markets which reaches the highest
price must evolve in several steps but a crash can occur in one step. 
To sum up this section, we offer a simple and intuitive reason why the RBE generates a
low riskless rate and a high equity premium.  Relative to 
 there are, at any time, optimists and
pessimists in the population of investors but on average there are more optimists than pessimists.
Since over the entire population the average belief must correspond to 
,  the rationality of belief
conditions imply that the intensity level of the pessimists dominates and their high demand for the
riskless asset raises its price, leading to a low equilibrium riskless rate and high equity premium.
3.5  The Dynamics of Asset Prices and Returns
We turn now to an examination of some dynamic characteristics of asset prices under the
1 
 2 
 .90 1 
 2 
 3.25
42
Fig. 1b: RBE SimulationFig. 1a: REE Simulation
RBE theory.  We start the discussion with an evaluation of the structure of asset price volatility
(i) The Structure of Asset Price volatility. We have noted that insufficient attention has been paid
in recent literature to the question of price volatility and the problem of evaluating price volatility
in the model in relation to real market price volatility.  Figures 1a, 1b present time series of model
simulation.  Each contains 200 realized price\dividend ratios (which we call "the" price) generated
by the REE of Table  2  and the RBE of  Table 3 with    and  .  The
standard deviation of the price\dividend ratio is .069 in the REE and 3.18 in the RBE.  There are
two distinct prices in the REE: 23.20 and 23.06 with a mean of 23.13.  In the RBE there are 6
distinct prices with a conditional mean of  25.82 given d , with a conditional mean of 21.14 given H
d  and with an unconditional mean of 23.48.  We decompose the standard deviation of prices inL
the RBE into two components.  The first component, which is overshooting, or an amplification
of the effect of  d   on prices, is measured by the standard deviation of a random variable whicht
takes the values of  25.82  when d  = d  and 21.14  when d  = d .  Hence, keeping the REEt        tH        L
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Fig. 2: RBE Simulation
functional relation between prices and exogenous variables, amplification or overshooting
increases the impact of exogenous variables on prices.
The second component of volatility is the pure effect which
 the states of belief have on
price volatility.  This component is uncorrelated with the exogenous dividend  process and
represents pure Endogenous Uncertainty which takes the form of additional prices induced by the
states of beliefs and by the variability of the states of beliefs over time. To define this effect let 
 when  and  0  otherwise, and let   when  and 0 otherwise.  Now
define .  In Figure 2 we exhibit 200 values of e  computed from thet
simulated values of the RBE in Figure 1b. What is interesting about Figure 2 is the asymmetry in
the distribution of  e   which is generated by the basic asymmetry in the causal structure oft
volatility in this model.  We conclude by noting that if we take the volatility of the price\dividend
ratio in the REE to be approximately the
volatility that can be justified by the
dividends, our analysis demonstrates that
most of the volatility of stock prices is
generated by the beliefs of the agents
either in the form of price amplification or
in the form of pure endogenous volatility. 
Thus, most of the volatility of asset prices
is endogenously generated.
  
However, an
examination of the relative contribution of these two components of endogenous volatility shows
that price amplification or overshooting is the more important of the two.  We return to this
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Fig. 3: RBE Simulation
conclusion in Section 4 when we discuss the issue of correlation of beliefs.  Here we note that our
result is consistent with the empirical evidence studied by Campbell and Shiller [1988]. 
(ii) The GARCH Property of Asset Returns.  In Figure 3 we exhibit  - the square of the risky
returns - associated with the prices generated by the RBE of Figure 1b.  Note that the bursts of
price volatility in Figure 1b reappear as a GARCH property of asset returns.  That is, Figure 3
shows that the variance of the risky rates of
return is stochastic. Since the growth of
dividends is a stationary Markov process, the
stochastic volatility of the risky return is the
result of the dynamical properties of the states
of belief in the market.  What is the cause for
the GARCH property of the risky return? To
answer this question recall the transition
matrix of the state of beliefs which we
reproduce here. We observe first that a regime of "agreement" (when in states OO or PP)
generates price variability which is sharply different from the price
(OO) (PP) (DIS)t + 1 t + 1 t + 1
   .50   .36    .14
   .14     0    .86
(DIS)t    .14     0    .86
variability in the regime of disagreement (when in state DIS).  Now suppose that at some
date the state of  belief is OO.  From OO the economy can move to all states of beliefs.  If it
R 2t R
2
t 
 !0  !1 dt  Jt
R 2t
R 2t 
 	.3192
(.0003 )
 .3541
(.0002 )
dt  Jt Jt  N(0 , ht)
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moves to  PP  it remains in the regime of agreement and if from PP it moves back to OO the
market completes a cycle within the regime of agreement.  If, however, it moves from PP to DIS,
a regime of disagreement is started with sharply different price volatility characteristics.  Note the
sharp spikes in Figure 2.  The highest price occurs only in the regime of agreement when the state
of belief is PP while the lowest "crash" price occurs in the recession when d  = d  and beliefs aret L 
in DIS.  As the states of belief change over time, returns move among different volatility regimes. 
Indeed, the stochastic volatility of returns is a Markov process with varying degrees of persistence
since the state of belief is a Markov process with varying degrees of persistence.  Hence the
GARCH property of asset return is caused by the dynamic properties of the regimes of belief.
 To formally examine the GARCH property of asset returns we simulated 100,000
observations of   in the RBE.  Estimating the regression   ,  we report in
Table 5 the first 10 terms of the autocorrelation function of the residual of  .  Note that the
first three terms are large and the majority of terms are positive but decline rapidly, a result which
Table 5: The Autocorrelation Function of the Residuals of the Squared Return Regression
lag      1      2     3     4      5 6 7 8 9 10
 .026  .044  .016  .007  -.003  -.005  .0007  .0003  .001  .004
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)  (.003)  (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
is compatible with the evidence (see Brock and LeBaron [1996]).   We have explored several
models that may best describe the behavior of the data over time.  Following the Akaike
Information Criterion, we found that the following E-GARCH(1, 1) model fits the data best:
  ,       
log(ht ) 
 	5.8139(.0216) 	 .2873(.0040) log(ht	1) 	 1.6924(.0064) |
Jt	1
ht	1
|  .4938
(.0038 )
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where
.
(iii) Regressions of long returns.  The issue of predictability of returns generated a significant
literature which we cannot review here ( see, for example, Fama and French [1988], Poterba and
Summers [1988], Campbell and Shiller [1988]).  Although there is substantial disagreement on the
interpretation of the empirical record, it seems to us that the stylized facts are as follows:
(i) Regression models of short returns of one day or one month have too much noise and exibit no 
statistically significant results;
(ii) Long returns exhibit mean reversion but the effect declines with the returns’ length;
(iii) The price\dividend ratio (equals, in our model, to the price\earning ratio) are the best
explanatory variables of long returns with correlation coefficients of ten year returns around .300.
In order to test the predictions of our model we shall consider two regression models.  To
do that let   be the return of length  k  from  t - k + 1  to t. 
Fama and French [1988] and Poterba and Summers [1988] allow both a mean reversion as well as
random walk effects to be present in their models.  Hence, in a regression of the form
,
the parameters  B   measure the combined impact of the two effects: B  = -.5 implies that thek          k
mean reversion effect dominates while B  = 0 implies that the random walk component dominates.k
To test the above we generated a random sample of 30,000 observations and estimated
the above regression for k = 1, 2, 3, ... , 20.  Before presenting these results we note that the unit
of time in our model is one year hence the model does not generate very short returns.  Therefore,
our results apply only to returns starting with k = 1 which is one year.  Table 6 records the
ˆBk
)
ˆB k
ˆBk R
2
ˆBk R 2
ˆBk
  Fama and French [1988] argue that the high volatility and pronounced mean reversion was unique9
to the 1926-1941 era whereas during the recent era of 1941-1985 the markets reverted to functioning more in
accord with the random walk theory.  This argument is supported by Kim, Morley and Nelson [1999] who
construct a model in which the presence of stochastic volatility induces changes in both the expected rate of
return as well as in the perceived riskiness of the returns.  When such an effect is introduced via a Hamilton’s
[1989] two-state Markov switching model, the measured effect of mean reversion declines substantially. 
This conclusion is clearly model-dependent.  Kim, Morley and Nelson [1999] do not dispute the empirical
results of Fama and French [1988], Poterba and Summers [1988] or Campbell and Shiller [1988]; they, as
well as Fama and French, propose an alternative interpretation of the facts.  Since our model exhibits
stochastic volatility with four volatility regimes, we could have conducted additional tests along these lines
but this cannot be done here since it  requires a complex and subtle analysis (see Kim, Morley and Nelson
[1999]).  Here we restrict ourselves to the statement of our model’s raw empirical predictions.
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estimated values and the R  of the regressions.  With 30,000 observations there is no point in2
reporting the standard errors .  The table shows that for small  k  the estimates are close to -.5
and hence the mean reversion effect dominates.  For larger  k  this effect declines and a random
walk effect becomes noticeable.  This qualitative result is the same as the results of Fama and
Table 6: Estimated Values of  and 
      k           
     1     -.529    .280
     2     -.471    .222
     3     -.469    .220
     4     -.469    .220
     5     -.462    .213
    6     -.464    .215
    8     -.444    .198
   10     -.428    .183
   20     -.376    .141
French [1988] and of Poterba and Summers [1988].  However, Fama and French [1988] find that 
 are in the interval of  (-.1 , -.4) only for horizons of up to k = 6 and decline sharply after that. 
They also report that the mean reversion effect is weak after 1941 and the results are strong only
for 1926 - 1941 .  Unfortunately, these conclusions of Fama and French [1988] are not confirmed9
by other studies.  More specifically, Poterba and Summers [1988] find a significant mean
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reversion in returns of up to  96  months which is the maximal returns’ length which they study. 
Campbell and Shiller [1988] show that (i) the regressions of returns are significant for 1 year and
for long horizons; the most significant results are obtained for 10 year returns which is the longest
horizon which they consider,  (ii) the (date t price)\(date t-1 dividend) ratio is a good predictor of
long returns and, (iii) the correlation coefficients obtained in predicting ten year returns with such
variables are around .300.  To compare our model with those of Campbell and Shiller [1988] we
estimate the following regression model proposed by these authors for  k = 1, 2, 3, ... , 20
.
Here we use the (date t price)\(date t-1 dividend) ratio to predict returns for  k = 1, 2, ... , 20. 
The results are reported in Table 7.   The table shows that our results are very close to those 
Table7: Estimated Values of   and  
      k    
     
      1   - .8920   .465
      2   - .8261   .424
      3   - .8431   .426
      4   - .8485   .422
      5   - .8453   .414
      6   - .8563   .414
      8   - .8474   .397
     10   - .8437   .383
     20   - .8459   .337
reported by Campbell and Shiller [1988].  We close this section by concluding that the Monte
Carlo results of our model replicate well the stylized facts reported earlier.
(vi)  The Forward Discount Bias in Foreign Exchange Markets.  Kurz [1997b] and Black [1997]
developed a model which is similar to ours except for the addition of a second country and two
more short term nominal debt instruments.  To define the problem that was addressed in these
ext1 	 ext
ext

 c   (rDt 	 rFt )  Jt1
(ext1 	 ext )
( rDt 	 rFt )
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papers suppose that you estimate a regression of the form
(23)
where  is the change of the exchange rate between date t and date t + 1 while
 is the difference between the short term nominal interest rates in the domestic and the
foreign economies.  Under rational expectations the differential of the nominal interest rates at  t 
should provide an unbiased predictor of the depreciation of the currency between date t and date 
t + 1.  This means that apart from a technical correction for risk aversion, the parameter   should
be close to 1.  In 75 empirical studies the estimates of the parameter    are significantly less than
1.  Indeed, in many studies this parameter was estimated to be negative (see Froot [1990], Engel
[1996] for an extensive survey).  The failure of this parameter to exhibit estimated values close to
1  is known as the "Forward Discount Bias" in foreign exchange markets.  Applying the RBE
theory to this market, Kurz [1997b] and Black [1997] estimated     to be .152.  However, the
specifications in their models were different from ours and violated the condition of anonymity
which we have imposed on our model.  We have thus reformulated the model so as to satisfy our
narrow parameter specification.  There are, however, several issues that need to be evaluated first.
If we think of the first agent as the "domestic U.S." and the second agent as a "foreign
economy" then we need to reformulate the model so as to allow the introduction of two nominal
interest rates, two different monetary policies and a different stochastic structure.  We thus
assume that there is only one stock market in the home currency and the stochastic process of
dividends is as in (5).  As in our model above we also assume that the endowment\dividend ratio
of the domestic agent is a constant  7  and the domestic economy has a real bill which is traded by
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both agents.  But then, how should we model the second country?  What is the meaning of an
exogenous shock in the foreign country?  With such difficulties we (along with Kurz [1997b] and
Black [1997]) model a hypothetical foreign economy which is characterized as follows:
(i) the endowment\dividend ratio 7* of the foreign agent is a random variable with two states 
 which is i.i.d. with the probability of    being .8;
(ii) the shocks to endowment are small, say of  2% - 3% hence in the REE   and
  and in the RBE  .  Monetary policy in the home
economy is responsive to the dividend shocks and monetary policy in the foreign country is
responsive to the endowment shock in the foreign economy.  The main reason for the endowment
shock in the foreign economy is to allow the determination of the exchange rate in any REE;
(iii)  an RBE requires a selection of a  
*  matrix to generate the stationary measure of the
equilibrium dynamics.  A matrix that satisfies the requirements specified is
(24) .
where A, B, C, and D are matrices of the form (16).  The crucial ingredient of the Explanatory
Neighborhood is the assumption   =   = .57 and  and we shall1  2
continue to maintain this assumption.
(iv) in our basic domestic model we set  A = B and  a = b = (.50, .14, .14, .14) which we shall
continue to assume.  Given that the probability of    is  .8,   it follows from the structure
of the matrix  
* that 80% of the time, the international economy will look very much like our
domestic economy when the second agent has endowment of  .  But now, how should we
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select C and D? What about the other 20% of the time when the lower part of  
*  is realized? 
To consider this point note that the arbitrary stochastic structure introduced by the i.i.d. process
of  { } introduces into  
* a new and arbitrary element which may have nothing to
do with the way the international economy actually works.  This change must have some effect
on the dynamics of the states of beliefs.  The effect that we found was entirely minimal and is
represented by the simple specification  c =  a = b = (.50, .14, .14, .14) but d = (.57, .14, .57, .14). 
Hence we can view the international model as a proper extension of our earlier model.
Summary of specification:  1 = .43,   ,    =   = .57, 1  2
, a =  b = c = (.50, .14, .14, .14), d = (.57, .14, .57, .14).  In the REE 
(7 = 24,  , ) ; in the RBE ( 7 = 26, , ).
Table 8 presents the simulation results for the REE and the RBE of the specified international
model.  In this table "ex"  denotes the "exchange rate" and   is the standard deviation of the
exchange rate.  Note first that the results for the REE are essentially the same as the results in 
Table 8:  Results for the Reformulated
International Model 
variable    REE     RBE  Empirical 
 Record
    p   23.31    23.94    23
   )       .37     2 .70      6.48p
   R     6.21%      7.80%      8.00%
   )     4.72%    19.34%    18.08%R
   r     5.64%      1.52%      1.00%F
      1.89%    16.37%      5.67%
   '       .57%      6.28%      7.00%
  ex       .68        .67       ----
      1.29%      9.93%       ----
          .95       .47  diverse < 1
Table 2 and the parameter    is computed to be .95,  as is expected.  From the point of view of
)
ex
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comparing the RBE with the REE the only new result is the much larger variance of the foreign
exchange rate in the RBE relative to the REE.  Since the foreign economy is hypothetical we do
not suggest any particular value for  ex  and .
  
Turning finally to the RBE, we observe that the
results here are essentially the same as in Tables 3 or 4 but the new result is the simulated
equilibrium value of    = .47  which is significantly less than 1.   We thus conclude that the
Forward Discount Bias is another anomaly which is explained
 by the same RBE model.  Sharper
results for     could probably be obtained by formulating a more realistic foreign sector.
Why does the RBE predict a value for    which is lower than 1?  Start by recalling the
REE argument in favor of    close to 1.  If   < 1  then in an REE agents can make an
expectational arbitrage: they can borrow in one currency and invest in the other, expecting that
the net return on their investment will be larger than the depreciation of the currency. Note that in
world of securities (rather than an Arrow-Debreu world of contingent claims) this is not an
arbitrage in the strict sense of the term since the trades do not take place at the same time. 
However, in a stationary world in which all agents hold the same rational expectations the
possibility of such an expectational riskless arbitrage cannot be an equilibrium. 
In an RBE agents hold diverse beliefs and invest based on their own beliefs.  In such a
world, a differential nominal interest rates across countries offers an investment opportunity but
now such investment is subjected to endogenous uncertainty.  This results in a true, equilibrium,
process of the exchange rate which exhibits excessive fluctuations in part due to variability in the
states of belief of the agents.  Hence, at almost all dates the nominal interest differential between
the two countries is not an estimate of the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate one period
later.  Why should we expect that under Rational Beliefs   < 1?   To see the reason, consider first
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an REE in which the difference between the domestic and foreign nominal rates is z%.  In that
equilibrium you do not need to form expectations on currency depreciation.  It is sufficient for
you to believe that other investors or currency arbitragers know the true probability of currency
depreciation and they have already induced the interest differential to be equal to the average rate
of currency depreciation which will then be z%.  Now consider an RBE.  All agents know that no
one knows the true probability distribution of the exchange rate and therefore the exchange rate is
subject to endogenous uncertainty.  Risk averse foreign currency investors would demand a risk
premium on endogenous uncertainty and, on average, the difference (1-)  is the proportional
premium on nominal interest differential demanded by currency investors for being willing to
carry foreign currency positions.  For a positive premium we need to have  < 1.
4.  Some Concluding Comments on Testable Implications of the RBE Theory and the
Dynamics of Prices
In this paper we advance the proposition that most of the observed volatility of asset
prices and returns is propagated by the beliefs of the agents.  We suggest that exogenous shocks,
central to REE based explanation of market fluctuations, are insufficient to explain the structure
of market volatility.  The RBE theory shows that market fluctuations arise from the joint effect of
exogenous shocks and the states of belief on the markets.  The theory claims that many REE
"anomalies" in financial markets such as the equity premium puzzle, the GARCH property of asset
returns and the Forward Discount Bias in foreign exchange markets, are all propagated by the
dynamics of beliefs in the markets.
In our discussion in the text we have touched upon several problems which need further
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clarifications.  In this concluding section we return to some of these important issues.
(i)  Should Beliefs be Rational Ex-Ante or Ex-Post?
The typical definition of an equilibrium with endogenous beliefs requires the beliefs to be
“self - fulfilling”.  This ex-post rationality condition of REE is based on the idea of a  stationary
environment.  In such an environment wrong beliefs are statistically rejected by the data generated
by an equilibrium and by the time we reach a large date t, such beliefs disappear from the market. 
We reject this idea and require any RB to satisfy ex-ante rationality conditions which stipulate that
at each date  t  the agent’s belief be compatible with the large record of past data available to him. 
The OLG model obscures this important issue which needs an explanation.
Our use of an OLG model was motivated by the feasibility of computations since in an
OLG context agents can hold simple RB.  To explain this point, suppose that agents were
infinitely lived and hence had many periods to observe future data and examine the outcomes of
their choices.  In that case an agent could examine the subsequence of dates t in which he was
optimistic about higher prices at  t + 1.  He would compute the frequency at which higher prices
were realized at  t + 1, compare it with the probability which he assigned to this event at date t
and discover that he was wrong.  Hence with a long sequence of future data, the agent would
falsify the simple RB used in this paper.  Such a conclusion may lead us to question whether the
simple Markov belief with two states should be considered “rational” when an agent has sufficient
future data to enable an ex-post rejection of his theory (i.e. his belief ).  We put this question
forward in order to stress that the ex-ante rationality axiom in Definitions 3 and 4 is justified by
two realistic perspectives which are central to the RBE theory: (i) the environment is non-
stationary hence complex and, (ii) an infinite horizon optimization means only that each agent has
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a bequest motive but actually lives a finite life.  Moreover, the length of his life is short relative to
the rate at which economic data arrives.  Let us explain these points.
A realistic description of the economy (see Kurz [1997a]) would view it as a non-
stationary process described by an infinite sequence of “regimes” each of which occurs only once. 
Moreover, the duration of each regime is relatively short so that the data arrival “clock” (typically
annual or quarterly) of key variables such as profits, GNP, productivity, inflation rate is slow
relative to the clock at which technology and organization change.  In such environments, an
agent’s non-stationary belief would be a far more complicated probability measure, allowing for
infinite number of possible regimes of technology and financial structure.  Under these conditions
even if an agent knew the true starting and ending dates of a regime, the data available for each
regime is usually insufficient to establish with high degree of confidence what the parameters of
that regime were.  The empirical identification of the switching dates is even a harder problem. 
Equally important is the finite decision life of economic agents.  Corporate executives,
fund managers, officers of financial institutions etc. typically have a decision life of 10-20 years
and even ordinary investors have a relatively short life of significant asset management. Given this
fact, suppose that a sequence of regimes occurring during his own life provide an agent data with
which he tests his belief statistically.  Suppose also that he concluded that there is high likelihood
that during this period his belief was wrong.  Such a conclusion has two implications to the RBE
framework.  First, in a non-stationary environment an RB has the property that even if the belief
was wrong during a regime under consideration, it does not constitute a proof that it will continue
to be wrong in the future and for this reason it continues to be an RB.  Second, by the time an
agent has sufficient data to statistically test his own belief (i.e. his market theory) he is close to the
Z (tk) Z (tk)
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end of his decision life.  A conclusion that his belief may have been wrong is simply too late; all
the important investment and consumption decisions have been made and cannot be reversed.
In sum, we reject ex-post rationality as inappropriate for a non-stationary economy since
in this environment there is no objective procedure to generate a consensus on the “correct” belief
no matter how large date t  is.  Equally so, in this environment past data is the only basis to judge
if a belief is rational or not.  Since ample data is available at the time an agent forms a belief, the
rationality of belief must be an ex-ante concept.  This also explains why an OLG model with
private, unobserved, assessment variables is a convenient environment for our analysis: the agent
has only one observation to test his belief and only past publicly observed data to evaluate the
rationality of his belief.  It should also be clear to the reader that computational feasibility has
prevented us from taking advantage of the full mathematical generality of the RBE framework.
(ii)  Comments on an Experimental Approach to Testing the Predictions of the RBE Theory
We now return to the question whether there are other ways to test the validity of the
RBE theory, apart from the simulation methods used in this paper.  Starting with econometric
methods we note that Kurz [1997a] and Chernozhukov and Morozov [1999] study econometric
restrictions on market data implied by the rationality conditions. For a parametric specification,
Chernozhukov and Morozov [1999] show how to deduce from market data on consumption and
portfolio choices the implied belief parameters of an agent and test if such a belief is rational.
Experimental approach offers an alternative way to test the implications of the theory.  We
have briefly touched upon this approach when we discussed the rationality conditions in (1).  To
provide more details, let  t  be the current period and consider the occurrence of any random
variable   at k dates after date t.  In our earlier example  = the annualized rate of
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return on the S&P500 stock index  k  periods after date  t.  Now find a sample of  H sophisticated
investors and ask each h  to provide forecasts    for k = 1, 2, 3,..., K.  The question
is then how could such data allow us to distinguish among the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis   I:  The agents hold Rational Expectations;
Hypothesis  II: The agents hold Rational Beliefs which are not Rational Expectations;
Hypothesis III: The agents are not rational.
To examine these, observe that using all past data agents can estimate the regression model which
best fits the data and make, with this empirical model, two forecasts:  and . 
Since we do not know the true data generating process, we need to define the term “holding
Rational Expectations”.  But, for an REE theory to make sense, one makes the standard REE
assumption that the economy is stationary and agents know that it is stationary.  Given this, the
agents will accept the empirically based forecast as the truth.  This leads us to a sequence of tests.
Test A:  k = 1
Under REE all agents will make the same conditional forecast of  ;
Under RBE the agents will make diverse conditional forecasts of , h = 1, 2, ..., H.
Test B:  k = 1, 2, 3, ..., K  for large K
Under REE all agents will make the same conditional forecast of  ;
Under RBE the agents will make diverse conditional forecasts of , k = 1, 2, ..., K
and for each h = 1, 2, ..., H the sequence of forecasts satisfies the rationality condition
(25)  .
Interpretation of Test Results.  For Test A the crucial difference between REE and RBE is simple:
Under REE agents agree that the one correct forecast is ;
E
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 We could not think of a better example of a random variable with respect to which no agent in the10
market has any private information.  Hence, the wide diversity of forecasts of the S&P500 is a striking
example of market and experimental observations where Tests A and B results go against the REE.
 The reader may perform this same experiment.  In practice we gave subjects the data of the annual11
returns on the S&P500 for 1889-1994 and computed for them values of the basic moments of the data.
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Under RBE we have a distribution of forecasts even if agents have the same information.
However, one cannot define irrational behavior under the single forecast for t + 1. 
For Test B we can make the following inference:
Under REE agents agree that the correct forecasts are ; this satisfies (25).
Under RBE agents make diverse forecast which must satisfy (25);
Agents are irrational if their forecast do not satisfy (25).
In several informal experiments we conducted Tests A and B for the case of   = the
annualized rate of return on the S&P500 stock index  k  periods after date  t .  In this case the10
REE forecast is approximately 8% for all  k  but all samples of investors, professional money
managers or doctoral students exhibit wide distribution of forecasts and, violating the REE
prediction, no sample ever provided a uniform forecast of 8% .  In contrast with the violation of11
the REE requirement, in almost all cases the forecasts fulfilled condition (25) implying that agents
satisfied the RBE rationality conditions.  However, in some cases the stronger version of the
rationality condition was satisfied.  This condition stipulates that 
(26)  
Condition (26) is a strong rationality condition requiring not only the convergence of the mean
forecast but the actual convergence of the agent’s long run forecast to the unconditional forecast
under m.  We briefly explain the conditions which lead to (26).
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  The presence of correlation may also suggest that there could be a relationship between an RBE12
with correlation and a “Correlated Equilibrium” (see Aumann [1987]) of a game.  To see why this is incorrect
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Recall that the definitions of Stability ( Definition 1) and WAMS (Definition 2) apply only
to finite dimensional (cylinder) sets  B%( ).  This restriction is based on the assumption that
agents have finite data with which they can determine the occurrence or non-occurrence of finite
dimensional sets only.  Suppose we reformulate Properties 1 and 2  by changing Definitions 1 and
2  to stipulate the stronger requirement that Stability holds for all measurable sets B%( )
and correspondingly define SAMS (strong asymptotic mean stationarity) to be Property 2, 
applicable to all measurable sets B%( ) including infinite dimensional sets.  A modified
Theorem 1' then says that the two properties are equivalent.  However, the SAMS condition 
    exists for all sets  B%( )
can be proved to require that for large t, we also have an approximate convergence condition
     for all sets B%( ).
This stronger condition (which satisfies condition (25)) appears to apply to some subjects.
(ii) The Dynamics and Correlation of Beliefs
A rather unique characteristic of the RBE studied earlier is the fact that there are 4
potential market states of beliefs (i.e. 4 values of ) and over time, the market state of
belief fluctuates. This fact might lead one to conclude that the fluctuations of the market state of
belief are essential to the volatility conclusions of the paper.  Related to this is the fact that in
formulating the model we assumed that the beliefs of the two agents could be correlated.  Indeed,
we introduced specific parameters which regulate this correlation and argued that the correlation
plays a role in the dynamics of prices .  Hence it is important to explain what is the role played by12
ykt  0 , 1 P(ykt 
 l) 
 .57
)
r F
note that if we think of an RBE as a game, then the strategy of the auctioneer is to select prices.  The strategy
of the players is to select consumptions and portfolios so as to maximize expected utility given observed
prices at t and given their rational beliefs about prices and dividends in future dates.  In no sense does an RBE
entail the agents selecting beliefs as strategies and hence correlation of beliefs has nothing to do with a
correlated equilibrium in which agent’s strategies are correlated. 
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the fluctuations of the market state of belief and of the correlation among agents.  We show first
that
 
both the fluctuations of the market state of belief as well as the correlation between the
individual states of belief have little to do with the volatility moments of Tables 3 and 4.
To explain the claim above, we follow Kurz [1998] and consider an OLG economy as
before except that now we introduce a continuum of agents with assessment variables which are
identically distributed across agents and are independent across any countable collection of
agents.  Assume also that each assessment variable is the same as in the model presented earlier: 
  and is  i.i.d. over time with .  It follows that in this economy there
is only one market state of belief which is (.57 , .43).  This is the fixed distribution of beliefs in the
economy: at any date t, 57% of the agents are optimistic and 43% are pessimistic about capital
gains at date t+1.  Consider now the time series of this economy, compute the moments discussed
earlier and compare with the moments in, say, the middle box (.57, .57) of Table 4.  Table 9 
 Table 9: Volatility Comparison of Models With and Without
Correlation of Beliefs
variable   RBE with a     RBE with    The
Single Market Correlation and     Empirical 
State of Belief   Four Market   Record
States of Belief
    )        4.10         3.18      6.48p
    R        9.55%         8.68%      8.00%
   )      31.00%       23.35%    18.08%R
    r          .43%           .71%      1.00%F
        24.30%       18.24%      5.67%
   '        9.98%         7.97%      7.00
1 
 2 
 .57  
 µ 
 1.754
 We observe that this result is supported by the empirical evidence reported by Campbell and13
Shiller [1988] who show that amplification of the effect of the fluctuations of dividends is the dominant cause
of excess volatility of returns.
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presents the results.  There are two surprising results in this table.  The first one is that the model
with a single market state of belief generates about the same volatility (measured by the moments)
as the model reported in Tables 3 and 4, in which the market states of belief fluctuate over time
and individual states of belief are correlated .  The second surprise is that the moments predicted13
by the model with a single market state of belief are reasonably close to the empirical record. 
The two results reported in the last paragraph have one explanation which is the factor
that enables the model to generate the moments reported in Tables 3 and 4.  This factor is the
interplay between the amplification or overshooting property of the model and the asymmetry
between the intensities of the pessimists and of the optimists in the model.  That is, the facts that
enable both models to generate moments close to the empirical record are that in both models we
have  (i)  and (ii) .  These two imply that in both models the optimists
are in the majority but the RBE rationality conditions require the pessimists to have a higher
intensity level.  This asymmetry has a decisive effect on the financial markets of both economies. 
 The natural question is then why should we consider models with multiple states of belief
which fluctuate over time and why should we be concerned with the correlation among  individual
states of beliefs of  agents in the economy?  The reason is that the model with a single market
state of belief generates results which are counter-factual with regard to the dynamics of prices. 
Examples of such results are:
(i) It implies that the variations in prices are perfectly correlated with the observed exogenous
shocks and hence are completely explainable by these exogenous changes. 
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(ii) It is a fact that major market declines are associated with recessions.  However, it is also a fact
that a fraction of major market declines incorrectly forecast recessions which do not materialize. 
This fact contradicts the implication of (i) which holds that the market never predicts recessions
which do not occur.   Technically speaking, a model with a single state of belief implies that all
Endogenous Uncertainty is an amplification of exogenous shocks.
(iii) It implies that there are no extreme market price increases and no market crashes. 
(iv) It fails to generate the stochastic volatility property of asset returns.
In short, there are two central reasons for our analysis of an RBE model in which the market state
of belief (i.e. the distribution of beliefs) fluctuates over time and individual states of belief are
correlated.  First, because available measures of the distribution of beliefs such as the distribution
of price and earning forecasts on Wall Street, published forecast distributions of inflation and
GNP, all exhibit significant fluctuations over time.  Second, if the model is to explain the empirical
record it must also exhibit price dynamics which is compatible with the characteristics of price
dynamics in the market.  We think that the model with fluctuating state of belief and some
correlation among beliefs is well suited for that goal.
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